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INTRODUCTION 
 was sitting on a bus when I first noticed a recurring phenomenon in 
my life: social media’s ability to out me as LGBTQ in public spaces. 
I had just moved away from Los Angeles and started to get my bearings 
in a new, much smaller city. I was on a crowded bus with my backpack 
in my lap, headphones in my ears, and my phone in my hand as I 
somewhat mindlessly scrolled through Twitter to entertain myself on 
the thirty-minute ride home from school. During those thirty minutes, 
I probably read some L.A. Times news story about home, liked some 
celebrity’s post, and retweeted something that made me laugh. But I 
had not stopped to think about how my internet use had already caused 
the inanimate piece of technology in my hand to identify me as 
LGBTQ. All the evidence was there for the algorithms to work their 
magic. I followed LGBTQ media sites like The Advocate and 
NewNowNext, and I even followed a few drag queens for some extra 
entertainment. For my phone, which was indubitably smarter than I, it 
was a no-brainer.  
Because my phone identified me as LGBTQ, however, a targeted 
advertisement interrupted my mindless scrolling. The advertisement 
was for an LGBTQ dating app I had no intention of downloading, and 
it included an image with just a bit more intimacy than I am 
comfortable seeing on a crowded bus. I quickly scrolled past the 
advertisement, but I became much more aware of the space I was 
occupying. I looked behind me. I looked next to me. I thought about 
who might have seen what was on my screen, and I started preparing 
what I would say if someone made a comment. I started preparing what 
I would do if the situation escalated beyond just a comment.  
Luckily, no conflict actually arose in this situation. As it turned out, 
the tired bus riders around me were not paying attention to the 
advertisements I was receiving between tweets from the Governor and 
my roommate from college. Nonetheless, this scenario opened my eyes 
to what I soon discovered to be a fairly common phenomenon. Within 
a few weeks, I received a text message from a close friend, thousands 
of miles away, who worried about whether the woman behind him on 
a commuter train had noticed a similar advertisement on his screen. 
I
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Shortly thereafter, a classmate complained about seeing a suggested 
post for an article titled “Ten Celebrities You Didn’t Know Were 
LGBTQ” when her attention moved from textbook to Facebook at the 
library.  
While these examples initially appear to be inconveniences more 
than safety concerns when taken at face value, LGBTQ individuals do 
not always have the fortune of being safely out in public spaces— 
and the story does not always end with physical safety. The danger of 
being “outed” in a nation that lacks federal protection for sexual 
orientation and gender identity implicates numerous possibilities for 
discrimination. LGBTQ people still risk being fired from their jobs or 
denied housing if too much of their personal information is revealed.1 
This reality gives much greater magnitude to the fact that an LGBTQ-
targeted advertisement can creep its way into social media and reveal 
too much about a person’s life in the wrong setting. Thus, without 
statutory protections for personal data, the potential consequences for 
LGBTQ internet users continue to stew.  
This Comment addresses the phenomenon of “outing” for the 
LGBTQ community through the lens of online data storage and argues 
that a more uniform data privacy scheme is necessary to mitigate the 
problem. Part I discusses “right of privacy” jurisprudence in federal 
courts and provides information about the segmented ways data is 
currently protected. Part I then uses that foundational information to 
identify a gap in United States data privacy—a gap that leaves the 
LGBTQ community vulnerable. Part II walks through features of other 
data privacy schemes, such as the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy 
Act (CCPA). Part III explores LGBTQ internet use and emphasizes the 
importance of LGBTQ privacy online.  
Finally, Part IV calls for federal legislation to increase protections 
over personal data and standardize data privacy in the United States. 
1 Although the Supreme Court extended Title VII employment discrimination 
protections to cover gender identity and sexual orientation in Bostock v. Clayton County, 
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), it remains unclear how religious exemptions may interfere. Jon 
Webb, Despite Supreme Court Ruling, You Can Still Get Fired for Being Gay, Transgender, 
COURIER & PRESS (June 16, 2020, 9:20 AM), https://www.courierpress.com/story/opinion 
/columnists/jon-webb/2020/06/16/despite-supreme-court-you-can-still-get-fired-being-gay 
-trans/3197494001/ [https://perma.cc/AJG5-JDJD]; see also Lou Chibbaro Jr., Study
Reveals LGBT Rental Housing Discrimination, WASH. BLADE (July 23, 2017, 9:10 AM),
https://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/07/03/lgbt-rental-housing-discrimination/ [https://
perma.cc/Y5N2-GCPU].
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Part IV also acknowledges and rebuts some lingering concerns with 
expansive data privacy, such as difficulties finding infringers in the 
field of intellectual property and general feasibility. The Comment 
ultimately concludes that federal data privacy legislation is a necessity. 
I 
BACKGROUND ON PRIVACY 
A. The “Right of Privacy” in the United States
Intuitively, personal privacy is extremely important—so important, 
in fact, that the United States recognizes it as a constitutional right.2 
Consequently, when citizens must disclose pieces of personal 
information to the government, our case law tells us the government 
must protect that information with robust systems to avoid infringing 
the right of privacy.3 But what about when our information exists 
outside these robust systems? And what about when our information is 
held by private companies, rather than by the government? The cell 
phones we all keep in our pockets, for example, contain more 
information about us than we realize, and the average citizen does not 
always know what is done with our information in the ethereal space 
we call the “cloud.”4 This creates a large question about how a lack of 
a data privacy system may implicate personal privacy concerns. This 
question becomes particularly concerning when considered with the 
fact that intimate details like sexual orientation may be compromised 
by a lack of adequate data privacy protections. Consequently, these 
concerns with personal devices’ capabilities and the intimate details 
they store collectively compel a more standardized system of data 
privacy for United States residents.  
When it comes to data held by government entities, the United States 
Supreme Court has long recognized the right of privacy for citizens.5 
In its landmark decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court found 
that the right of privacy is woven into the Constitution, and held 
that the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments collectively breathe life into a privacy right “older than 
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965). 
3 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977). 
4 See Joe McKendrick, Most Americans Don’t Understand Cloud Computing: Does It 
Really Matter?, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012, 9:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joe 
mckendrick/2012/08/29/most-americans-dont-understand-cloud-computing-does-it-really 
-matter/?sh=39d477044ef7 [https://perma.cc/T2AR-ZM6Y].
5 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85.
2021] How LGBTQ Internet Users Present a Case 527 
 for Federal Data Privacy Legislation
the Bill of Rights” itself.6 The bounds of this right were not clearly 
drawn at the time, but the Court later suggested in Whalen v. Roe that 
the right of privacy is broad and covers both the interest in personal 
matters remaining undisclosed and the interest in making important 
decisions independently.7 
In Whalen, a New York statute was challenged under both protected 
privacy interests.8 The statute required doctors who prescribed certain 
legal drugs to file a form with the state that included patients’ names, 
addresses, and ages.9 The challengers alleged that the statute created a 
potential for disclosure of personal information and discouraged 
patients from choosing to accept prescriptions.10 The Court ultimately 
held that no privacy rights were invaded,11 but the Court did highlight 
the fact that collection and storage of data must generally be paired with 
security provisions and duties to avoid unwarranted disclosures.12 
Thus, a defined, secure system for storing citizens’ information would 
appropriately protect the right of privacy as it pertains to government 
action. With this in mind, however, there is still a unique concern 
regarding the power that private actors hold as they collect and store 
the intimate details we reveal on our personal devices.  
Supreme Court Justices have acknowledged the uniqueness of data 
stored on personal devices.13 Chief Justice John Roberts has drawn 
special attention to cell phone storage capabilities, for example, and has 
drawn attention to how much our phones reveal about our personal 
lives.14 Private information, such as addresses, bank information, and 
photographs, is frequently found in cell phones—all with stamps of 
time, date, and location to string together a person’s precise story.15 
Additionally, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has expressed fear that personal 
freedoms can be restricted by the knowledge that the “government may 
be watching”16 and has cautioned that intimate details like sexual 
associations may be inappropriately discovered and abused using the 
6 Id. at 484, 486.  
7 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600. 
8 Id. at 599.  
9 Id. at 592.  
10 Id. at 600. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 606.  
13 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014). 
14 Id. at 394.  
15 Id.  
16 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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information stored in cell phones.17 While these opinions from the 
Justices again address the protection of privacy only as it relates to 
government action, the sentiments, nonetheless, carry weight in the 
realm of general privacy in the digital age. If the Justices of our highest 
court are so concerned with the damage that can be done to citizens 
when the government uses their personal data, it seems to follow that 
United States residents deserve greater protections overall. 
Other federal courts have held that sexual orientation, specifically, 
falls within the “zone of privacy” to be protected.18 In Sterling v. 
Borough of Minersville, the Third Circuit held that a teenage boy’s 
right of privacy was violated19 when a police officer threatened to 
disclose the boy’s sexual orientation to his grandfather if the boy did 
not do so on his own.20 The fear of being outed ultimately led the boy 
to die by suicide, and his mother filed suit alleging that the officer’s 
threat of disclosure violated her son’s right of privacy under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.21 In response, the Third Circuit recognized 
that information about sexuality should be “carefully guard[ed].”22 
Finding it difficult to picture anything more private than sexuality, the 
court suggested that a legitimate government disclosure of a person’s 
sexual identity would be rare.23  
Although Sterling did not specifically involve a disclosure flowing 
from stored personal data, the court’s remarks demonstrate that sexual 
identity is a highly sensitive matter worthy of protection under the law. 
Viewing this concern in tandem with the Supreme Court’s caution 
regarding data storage on personal devices, there is a compelling reason 
to standardize data privacy law to provide uniform protection over 
intimate details such as sexual orientation, whether or not that 
information lies in the hands of the government or private actors. But 
17 See id. at 415–16. 
18 E.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).  
19 Id. at 198. 
20 Id. at 193. The police officer found the teenage boy sitting in his car with a male friend. 
Id. at 192. Suspicious that the boys had been drinking alcohol, the officer searched the car 
and discovered two condoms. Id. The officer then questioned the boys about whether they 
were in the car together for sexual purposes, and the boys confirmed that they were. Id. The 
boys were ultimately arrested for underage drinking, but the officer separately “counseled 
[them] against homosexual activity” and threatened to disclose their relationship. Id. at 192–
93.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 196. 
23 Id.  
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still, the United States does not have a statutory scheme for data 
privacy.  
B. The Futility of Existing Data Privacy Protections
In the absence of a uniform data privacy scheme, the United States 
has only loose opportunities available to address data privacy concerns. 
These opportunities can be considered in three categories. First, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stepped into the role of policing 
consumer privacy and data security.24 The FTC’s role, however, is still 
very limited, and the scope of the FTC’s authority has unclear 
bounds.25 Second, nonprofit organizations such as the Network 
Advertising Initiative (NAI) have provided privacy guidelines for 
technology providers, but these organizations allow very little room for 
direct consumer remedy and still pose problems. Third, some federal 
statutes touch on data privacy and protect very specific industries,26 but 
these statutes do not provide United States citizens any generic 
protections over their data.  
1. The Role of the FTC
As industries have rapidly embraced the capabilities of the internet,
the FTC has arisen as the primary entity for policing consumer privacy 
and security.27 The FTC’s authority is only implied, however, as 
there is no express provision regarding data in the agency’s enabling 
statute.28 The statute only provides the FTC authority to prevent the 
use of “unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices” that have an effect on commerce.29 Consequently, the 
FTC is only able to regulate data privacy in instances where the use of 
consumer data is part of deceptive or unfair business practices.30 
Because data privacy concerns can extend beyond just deceptive or 
unfair uses of consumer data, the FTC’s authority regarding data 
24 Julia Whall, Policing Cyberspace: The Uncertain Future of Data Privacy and Security 
Enforcement in the Wake of  LabMD, 60 B.C. L. REV. ELEC. SUPP. II.-149, II.-153 (2019). 
25 See id. at II.-160. 
26 Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 
2013 Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 COMPETITION 229, 230 (2015). 
27 Whall, supra note 24, at II.-153. 
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
29 Id. § 45(a)(2).  
30 Whall, supra note 24, at II.-154. 
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privacy is limited. Furthermore, the scope of the FTC’s authority 
remains unclear.  
The FTC has settled nearly all its actions against companies that 
have breached consumer data security.31 As a result, the agency has not 
promulgated any rules,32 nor has the agency’s authority been clarified 
significantly through case law. In a Third Circuit case, for example, 
the court declined to analyze the FTC’s interpretation of its own 
authority in the context of data security.33 Rather, the Third Circuit 
resolved the issue by deciding whether a company’s conduct could be 
considered “unfair” under the language of the statute despite the FTC’s 
interpretation.34  
Another case, recently decided in the Eleventh Circuit, arguably 
muddied the FTC’s role in the realm of data privacy.35 The Eleventh 
Circuit did little to clarify what authority the FTC actually holds, yet 
the court criticized the “reasonableness” standard the FTC had been 
using to determine what constitutes an unfair business practice.36 More 
specifically, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the FTC must identify 
which acts are unfair within a data security program rather than 
deem the program wholly unfair.37 After this case, the FTC has little 
guidance on how to regulate data practices, and private companies have 
little guidance on how to comply.38 Thus, the efforts to regulate data 
privacy at the federal level are insufficient and likely create more 
confusion than protection for consumers. 
Despite the murky nature of the FTC’s authority, the agency has 
consistently displayed interest in clarifying consumer data rights.39 The 
31 Wooten, supra note 26, at 236.  
32 Id. 
33 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2015). 
34 Id. at 255. 
35 See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC (LabMD III), 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018); Whall, supra 
note 24, at II.-164. 
36 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1235–36. 
37 See id. at 1237. 
38 Julia B. Jacobson et al., Be Reasonable: Recent FTC Enforcement Orders on Data 
Security, LAW.COM (June 24, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2020 
/06/24/how-to-be-reasonable-recent-ftc-enforcement-orders-on-data-security/?slreturn= 
20201014013246 [https://perma.cc/4HF3-ZTND] (“Despite this relatively long history of 
data security activity, the FTC is criticized for insufficiently clear guidance about what 
reasonable data security means, including by the 11th Circuit, which vacated a 2016 FTC 
data security mandating ‘a complete overhaul of LabMD’s data-security program’ because 
it offered ‘precious little about how this is to be accomplished.’”). 
39 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, at i (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT], 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff 
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FTC held a series of public hearings in 2006 to prepare for potential 
consumer privacy issues as technology continued to develop.40 
Following these hearings, the FTC began to focus significantly on 
concerns with online behavioral advertising, or “the practice of 
tracking consumers’ activities online to target advertising.”41 This 
practice, familiar to most internet users, is what causes an LGBTQ-
targeted advertisement to manifest on social media—whether or not it 
is actually desired.  
To respond to specific concerns about online behavioral 
advertisements, the FTC held town halls and welcomed public 
commentary to develop a set of self-regulatory principles for online 
advertisers.42 The agency ultimately developed four principles for 
online advertisers to follow: transparency, reasonable security and 
limited retention of data, express consumer consent to make material 
changes to privacy policies, and express consumer consent to use 
sensitive data.43 These principles aim to balance the benefits of 
behavioral advertising with the importance of consumer privacy and 
control.44 It is important to note, however, that these principles—as 
well as other reports and guidelines produced by the FTC—only 
provide a “soft” legal basis.45 The principles may nudge online 
advertisers to adjust their practices, but that does not mean they are 
mandatory or provide a remedy when they are not followed.46 So while 
the FTC may recognize that sensitive information like sexual 
orientation should be protected,47 recognition alone cannot prevent 
improper use of sensitive information, nor does it allow a citizen to 
seek remedy from the entity misusing the information.  
-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-dvertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/Q42J-UFRL].
40 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION 




41 Id.  
42 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 39, at i–ii. 
43 Id. at 46–47.  
44 Id. at ii.  
45 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 625 (2014). 
46 See id. at 626.  
47 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 39, at 23. 
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2. The Role of the NAI
The realm of online behavioral advertising is also led by the
Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to collecting and using data responsibly.48 The NAI is a self-
regulatory organization consisting of more than one hundred member 
companies,49 including Google and Microsoft.50 Since 2000, NAI 
member companies have collaborated to create and update a code of 
conduct that each company must follow to ensure that user data is 
treated uniformly.51  
The current NAI Code of Conduct outlines a number of requirements 
for its members.52 For example, NAI members must give “clear, 
meaningful, and prominent notice” to users regarding the way data is 
collected, transferred, and used for tailored advertising.53 Additionally, 
NAI members are required to make reasonable efforts to educate users 
on the choices they have available regarding tailored advertising,54 
with the choices varying based on the amount of sensitive data 
involved.55 Notably, the NAI treats information about users’ sexual 
orientation as sensitive,56 and the Code of Conduct requires opt-in 
consent from users to collect or store information about actual or 
perceived LGBTQ status.57 Although these requirements demonstrate 
an admirable concern for user privacy, two general problems still 
persist with data collection and use. First, a large disconnect still exists 
between users and advertisers due to the complexity of privacy policies, 
which can make consent ineffective when it is required. Second, the 
NAI’s self-regulatory nature may be insufficient for holding companies 
48 About the NAI, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, https://www.networkadvertising.org 
/about-nai/about-nai [https://perma.cc/Z9LG-56HK]. 
49 Id. 
50 NAI Members, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, https://www.networkadvertising 
.org/participating-networks/?page=1 [https://perma.cc/Z59P-URP5] (full list of member 
companies). 
51 About the NAI, supra note 48; NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, 2020 NAI CODE OF 
CONDUCT 1 (2020) [hereinafter NAI CODE OF CONDUCT], https://www.networkadvertising 
.org/sites/default/files/nai_code2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2VE-SYWT].  
52 NAI CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 51, at 10–15. 
53 Id. at 10. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 Id. at 9.  
57 Id. at 24. 
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accountable, and members are not always compliant with their own 
requirements.58 
NAI member compliance with notice, education, and consent 
requirements often takes the form of detailed privacy policies.59 The 
problem with these policies, however, is that they are often too dense 
for users to reasonably read them.60 Additionally, even if users read 
privacy policies, studies show that the average lay internet user cannot 
sufficiently decode the complex, verbose descriptions of how their 
data gets stored and used.61 As a result, the NAI Code of Conduct 
requirements may not adequately protect users. NAI members cannot 
truly obtain the consent they require from internet users to collect and 
store sensitive data if the users do not understand the scope of the 
consent they are giving. The sentiment behind requiring consent and 
the process of subsequently obtaining consent are thus mismatched.  
The NAI enforces its requirements in a self-regulatory manner, 
meaning NAI member companies evaluate and adjust their own 
compliance via self-assessments and user complaints.62 The NAI 
sometimes refers matters to the FTC for evaluation, but the NAI 
generally decides for itself how the Code of Conduct applies.63 
Moreover, even when matters are referred to the FTC and litigated, 
NAI members are not always held accountable for violations. 
For example, in United States v. Google, Google paid a civil penalty 
for an alleged violation of an FTC order to comply with consent 
requirements, but there was one caveat—Google paid the penalty 
without admitting liability.64 The FTC initially brought suit alleging 
that Google improperly used Gmail users’ information and 
automatically enrolled them in its social networking platform, Google 
58 See generally Saranga Komanduri et al., Ad Choices? Compliance with Online 
Behavioral Advertising Notice and Choice Requirements, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 603 (2012) (presenting an NAI member compliance study that specifically analyzed 
members’ notice and opt-out policies). 
59 NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, GUIDANCE FOR NAI MEMBERS: OPT-IN CONSENT  
6 (Nov. 2019), https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/nai_optinconsent 
-guidance19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N4U-CHS2].
60 Komanduri et al., supra note 58, at 607.
61 Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 83 (2015). 
62 NAI CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 51, at 16. 
63 Id. at 6.  
64 United States v. Google, Inc., No. CV 12-04177 SI, 2012 WL 5833994, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 16, 2012). 
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Buzz, despite statements that it would not.65 Google settled the case by 
entering a consent order with the FTC, which prohibited Google from 
further misrepresenting its data collection practices.66 The FTC later 
alleged, however, that Google violated the consent order by overriding 
Safari users’ ability to opt out of Google’s data collection and 
continuing to collect users’ information.67 In response, Google signed 
a stipulated judgment, agreeing to pay a large civil penalty and delete 
any cookies that improperly collected Safari users’ information.68 But 
despite paying a penalty and adjusting its systems, Google denied that 
it ever violated the FTC’s order.69 Thus, there is no record that 
Google’s conduct constituted a violation, which suggests that the NAI 
Code of Conduct is not always strictly enforced—even when the most 
serious matters are referred to the FTC. 
3. Federal Statutes
Although one might expect federal statutes to clarify how
constitutionally enumerated rights like the right of privacy get 
protected, federal statutes have only fractured and segmented the scope 
of data privacy protections. Under current federal law, only specific 
types of data held by specific entities receive protections. 
Consequently, United States citizens’ data can be subject to numerous 
procedures and standards, or none at all, depending on the context.  
For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) generally protects patients’ privacy rights in their 
medical information.70 Notably, however, HIPAA protections depend 
on the type of information held and who holds it.71 Thus, while 
information like a patient’s HIV status may be protected when 
electronically stored by a healthcare provider, that same information 
is not subject to HIPAA protections if an individual provides it on a 
mobile app unrelated to health care.72 Moreover, even if information 
65 Id. at *1.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *2.  
69 Id. 
70 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.).  
71 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020); 87 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (2006). 
72 See 87 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (2006). A dating app, for example, would not 
fit HIPAA’s definition of a covered entity, and thus the sharing of HIV status on a dating 
app would not be protected by HIPAA.  
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regarding HIV status is subject to HIPAA protections, HIPAA itself 
sets out situations in which the information becomes subject to state 
law,73 adding another layer of complication to the already tangled 
method of protecting sensitive data.  
Federal statutes protect other sector-specific types of data as well, 
such as educational records74 and financial information.75 Certain 
documentary materials and work products are also subject to protection 
from search and seizure,76 but these protections have become unclear 
as technology has changed the way we share information.77 The 
existence of these sector-specific statutes merely bandages certain 
types of privacy injuries and leaves many other privacy interests 
vulnerable to intrusion. These sector-specific statutes also make the 
method of protecting privacy overcomplicated and seem to beg for a 
more uniform system.  
C. Identifying a Gap
Privacy is both intuitively and constitutionally recognized as 
important to United States residents.78 But despite its importance, no 
uniform system has been developed to protect data privacy interests in 
the digital age. Rather, a complicated web of thin protections has been 
woven to solve problems as they have arisen. The problem with this 
web is that it is filled with gaps—gaps that leave internet users 
vulnerable to their information falling outside their control. Internet 
users in the United States have no uniform way of seeking a legal 
remedy for invasions of data privacy, even as they become more and 
more dependent on the internet. Thus, it is high time for Congress to 
standardize the way the United States treats the collection, storage, and 
transmission of its residents’ data.  
73 Id. § 18. 
74 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.  
75 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x.  
76 Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
77 Elizabeth B. Uzelac, Reviving the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
1437, 1451–52 (2013). 
78 See supra Section I.A. 
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II 
OTHER DATA PRIVACY SCHEMES 
A. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
In 2016, the European Union took a momentous step by introducing
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which greatly 
expanded and uniformly outlined the privacy rights of European 
internet users.79 The GDPR took effect in 2018 and set a minimum 
standard of data protection with which each member state must 
comply.80 The European Union had previously attempted to regulate 
data privacy through the European Union Data Protection Directive, 
but the Directive only set forth principles for each member state to 
incorporate into its own unique privacy schemes.81 Thus, the GDPR 
took what was once a patchwork system of data protection and, for the 
first time, set a uniform level of protection across the entire European 
Union.82 
1. The GDPR’s Features
The GDPR’s text begins with the overarching principles and
sentiments behind regulating data more carefully.83 The GDPR notes 
that principles of “lawfulness, fairness and transparency” must guide 
the way personal data is processed,84 and reasonable steps must be 
taken to maintain the data’s accuracy.85 Additionally, data collection 
must be limited to “specified, explicit[,] and legitimate purposes,”86 
and the data must  be stored only for as long as is necessary to fulfill 
those purposes.87 The quantity of stored data must also be minimized 
and limited to the amount necessary to fulfill the relevant purposes.88 
All the while, data must be processed in a way that guarantees 
79 Peta-Anne Barrow et al., International Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY 14-
1, 14-9 to -10 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2d ed. 2018). 
80 Id. at 14-9.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 14-10.  
83 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), art. 5, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35, 36 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
84 Id. art. 5(1)(a). “Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person.” Id. art. 4(1).  
85 Id. art. 5(1)(d). 
86 Id. art. 5(1)(b). 
87 Id. art. 5(1)(e). 
88 Id. art. 5(1)(c). 
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“integrity and confidentiality” for data subjects.89 Finally, the GDPR 
sets forth a principle of “accountability,” holding data controllers 
responsible for demonstrating their compliance on their own accord.90 
The GDPR also provides an explicit set of rights for data subjects,91 
giving data subjects more control over their relationships with data 
controllers. For example, data subjects in the European Union now 
have the right to access a report from controllers detailing what data 
is being processed and how it is being processed.92 Data subjects 
also have the right to correct inaccuracies in their data93 and even 
completely erase pieces of their data in certain circumstances, 
including when their data has been processed unlawfully, their data is 
no longer necessary for fulfilling relevant purposes, or they have 
withdrawn requisite consent.94 Data subjects may also object to their 
data being processed for the public interest or the interests of 
controllers, and controllers can overcome an objection only if they can 
demonstrate a “compelling[,] legitimate” reason to override the data 
subject’s rights.95  
Under the GDPR, data subjects may also refuse to be subject to 
automated processing decisions.96 These processing decisions 
explicitly include those that produce legal effects or other significant 
effects based on profiling.97 Additionally, data subjects in the European 
Union have the right to receive a portable, “commonly used and 
machine-readable” copy of their data from a controller so they can 
transmit the data to a different controller without hindrance.98 Finally, 
89 Id. art. 5(1)(f). Although the GDPR does not define “data subject,” the term 
encompasses anyone whose data gets held, controlled, or processed. What Is a Data 
Subject?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT, https://eugdprcompliant.com/what-is-data-subject/ 
[https://perma.cc/G8U2-A34D].  
90 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 5(2). A data “controller” is a “natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency[,] or other body which . . . determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data.” Id. art. 4(7).  
91 Id. arts. 15–22. Specifically, the GDPR gives data subjects the right of access, the right 
to rectification, the right to erasure, the right to restriction of processing, the right to data 
portability, the right to object to data processing, and the right to not be subject to automated 
decision-making. Id.; Barrow et al., supra note 79, at 28–30.  
92 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 15. 
93 Id. art. 16. 
94 Id. art. 17. 
95 Id. art. 21. 
96 Id. art. 22(1). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. art. 20.  
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data subjects have the right to restrict the processing of their personal 
data when they do not wish to object to processing wholesale but 
nonetheless have concerns with the lawfulness or accuracy of the 
controller’s practices.99  
Some of the rights outlined in these GDPR provisions existed 
in various forms while European Union member states were 
implementing their own systems, and other rights were newly 
introduced with the GDPR.100 Ultimately, these rights, combined with 
the overarching principles of compliance, create a more concrete 
relationship between data subjects and data controllers, and these rights 
more evenly balance the level of control each party can exercise.  
Another significant feature of the GDPR is its heightened standard 
when data practices require consent from data subjects.101 To consent 
to a data controller’s privacy policy, a data subject must freely give a 
“specific, informed[,] and unambiguous indication” that they agree 
with the terms of the processing.102 This indication must be in the form 
of a “statement” or “clear affirmative action.”103 Thus, something like 
a pre-checked box is insufficient to show consent.104 Rather, data 
subjects must affirmatively check the box on their own.105 In addition, 
the GDPR heightens the standard even more for categories of data 
deemed to be sensitive.106 This category of sensitive data includes 
information that reveals racial origin, religious beliefs, and sexual 
orientation.107 Before any data falling into this category is processed, 
the data controller must separately receive “explicit consent” from the 
subject,108 which can be provided via email, a signed document, or 
some other form.109 Under this standard, data controllers must do much 
more than provide a box at the end of a catchall policy, as many data 
subjects are accustomed to.  
99 See id. art. 18.  
100 Barrow et al., supra note 79, at 28. 
101 Id. at 27.  
102 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 4(11).  
103 Id. 
104 Barrow et al., supra note 79, at 27. 
105 Id.  
106 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 9(1).  
107 Id.  
108 Id. art. 9(2)(a). 
109 Barrow et al., supra note 79, at 27. 
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2. Enforcement and Remedies in the European Union
The GDPR outlines specific enforcement provisions to give these
significant rights and responsibilities teeth.110 Specifically, the GDPR 
gives data subjects both the right to file complaints with supervisory 
authorities (an administrative remedy, subject to judicial review)111 
and the right to file complaints in an individual capacity against data 
controllers and processors in a judicial forum.112 The GDPR also 
allows nonprofit organizations to bring claims on behalf of data 
subjects, even without an explicit mandate from data subjects.113 
Accordingly, independent nonprofit organizations are empowered to 
investigate and pursue claims against data controllers and processors in 
the public interest.114 
If an individual pursues a claim and successfully shows that they 
have been damaged—whether materially or immaterially—by an 
infringement of the rights discussed above, then that person is entitled 
to compensation from the responsible controller or processor.115 For 
actions brought to supervisory authorities under administrative 
procedures, a set of factors determines the amount a liable party can be 
fined.116 The compensation amounts calculated with these factors are 
subject to damage caps, but these caps are still substantial.117 For 
example, failure to obtain adequate consent to use sensitive data is 
subject to a cap of €20,000,000 (approximately $22,379,125) or “up to 
110 See GDPR, supra note 83, arts. 77–84.  
111 Id. arts. 77–78.  
112 Id. art. 79. A “processor” is an entity that processes personal data on behalf of a data 
controller. Id. art. 4(8). Processors and controllers may be attributed differing levels of 
liability depending on their relationship and the extent of their fault. See id. art. 82(2)–(5). 
113 Id. art. 80.  
114 See id. 
115 Id. art. 82.  
116 Id. art. 83(2). Article 83 of the GDPR provides eleven factors for determining 
an appropriate fine: (1) the nature, gravity, and duration of the infringement; (2) the intent 
or negligence involved in the infringement; (3) the extent to which actions were taken to 
mitigate damage; (4) the degree or responsibility of controllers and processors based on their 
organizational setup; (5) relevant previous infringements; (6) the degree of cooperation to 
remedy the infringement and mitigate future effects; (7) the categories of data involved 
in the infringement; (8) the way the infringement became known, including whether the 
controller or processor came forward on their own; (9) whether the controller or processor 
has complied with previous orders concerning the same subject matter; (10) whether the 
controller or processor has adhered to approved codes of conduct or certification 
mechanisms; and (11) any factors that aggravate or mitigate the circumstances of the 
infringement. Id.  
117 Id. art. 83(3)–(6). 
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4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
year, whichever is higher.”118 Thus, even within the limits of damage 
caps, data controllers and processors may be liable for significant 
amounts depending on the nature of their noncompliance.  
Also, for any actions brought outside the administrative procedures 
(i.e., actions brought straight to a judicial forum), the GDPR leaves 
authority in the hands of European Union member states to set penalty 
rules, so long as the penalties are “effective, proportionate[,] and 
dissuasive.”119 Under such an enforcement scheme, the European 
Union has consequently taken one of the largest steps toward achieving 
effective and uniform data privacy practices. 
B. The California Consumer Privacy Act
More recently, California has also taken steps to protect its residents’ 
data in the age of rapid technological development.120 The state 
enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in 2018, and the 
law officially took effect on January 1, 2020.121 The law was later 
expanded and amended in November 2020 when California passed 
Proposition 24, also known as The California Privacy Rights Act of 
2020.122 The CCPA is said to be the most comprehensive piece of 
legislation to address privacy in the United States, although it does not 
quite reach the strict, sweeping influence of the GDPR.123 Unlike the 
GDPR, which applies to all European Union data processors and 
controllers,124 the CCPA applies only to large, for-profit businesses 
that meet certain threshold requirements involving annual gross 
revenues and data sales.125 Nonetheless, the CCPA puts forth new and 
118 Id. art. 83(5). The conversion from Euros to American dollars was calculated using 
the exchange rate as of March 15, 2020. US Dollar Exchange Rates for March 15, 2020 
Against Currencies in Europe, EXCHANGE-RATES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.exchange 
-rates.org/HistoricalRates/E/USD/3-15-2020 [https://perma.cc/EV3U-295P].
119 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 84(1).
120 Kari Paul, California’s Groundbreaking Privacy Law Takes Effect in January. What




122 California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 24 (West) 
(to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798). The amendments will take effect in 2023.  
123 Id. 
124 See GDPR, supra note 83, arts. 2–3.  
125 Elaine F. Harwell, What Businesses Need to Know About the California Consumer 
Privacy Act, A.B.A. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law 
/publications/blt/2019/10/ca-consumer-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/N8Y2-RM7G]. 
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unique rights for California residents and provides the opportunity for 
relief if businesses infringe those rights. 
1. The CCPA’s Features
The CCPA explicitly notes that it was born out of the
constitutionally protected right of privacy126 and is thus intended to 
provide the greatest protection possible for California residents.127 To 
ensure that the greatest protections are provided, the CCPA clarifies 
that its provisions apply to all personal information collected or sold by 
businesses, not just to electronic or internet information.128 
Additionally, if the CCPA comes into conflict with another law, the 
CCPA concedes that the law that more adequately protects the 
constitutional right of privacy should govern.129 
Similar to the GDPR, the CCPA gives California “consumers” a 
set of unique rights in their data.130 For instance, the CCPA gives 
Californians the right to access categories and specific pieces of their 
personal data being collected and sold by businesses.131 Businesses 
must provide at least two methods for consumers to make these 
requests free of charge.132 Furthermore, the CCPA gives consumers 
the right to delete data that businesses have collected.133 This right 
is not limited to particular circumstances,134 but it comes with a list 
of exceptions—including when maintaining a consumer’s data is 
necessary to complete a transaction, provide a good or service 
Specifically, the CCPA applies to entities that do business in California and meet one of the 
following thresholds: having annual gross revenues of more than $25 million; selling or 
sharing the information of at least 100,000 consumers, households, or devices; or deriving 
at least half of annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.140(c)(1)(A)–(C) (West 2020). 
126 CIV. § 1798.175 (West 2020). 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 DATAGUIDANCE & FUTURE OF PRIV. F., COMPARING PRIVACY LAWS: GDPR  
V. CCPA 25–37 (Dec. 2019), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA
_Comparison-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC98-7HVA]. The CCPA broadly defines a
“consumer” as any natural person who is a California resident. CIV. § 1798.140(g) (West
2020).
131 CIV. § 1798.100(a) (West 2020). 
132 Id. § 1798.130(a)(1)(A). If the business maintains a website, the business must make 
the website available as a method for submitting requests. Id. § 1798.130(a)(1)(B) (emphasis 
added). 
133 Id. § 1798.105(a). 
134 See id. 
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requested by the consumer, ensure the security and integrity of the data, 
engage in scientific research, or exercise free speech.135  
The CCPA also provides consumers the right to opt out of their data 
being sold or shared.136 Unlike the GDPR, which provides data 
subjects an ongoing right to object to data processing as issues arise,137 
the CCPA gives consumers the ability to remove themselves at the 
outset from situations in which their data would be sold.138 To further 
this right for consumers, businesses must provide “clear and 
conspicuous link[s]” on their websites saying “Do Not Sell My 
Personal Information.”139 Businesses must also explain the right to opt 
out in their privacy policies.140 Notably, businesses cannot combat 
consumers’ requests to not have their data sold,141 and “selling” is very 
broadly defined to include essentially any transaction, transfer, or 
release of data completed for “monetary or other valuable 
consideration.”142 California consumers thus have a very powerful tool 
to protect themselves wholesale from certain data practices.  
2. Enforcement and Remedies in California
The rights and responsibilities under the CCPA are enforced by the
California Attorney General through administrative processes.143 The 
Attorney General is responsible for soliciting public participation 
to create regulations that update and clarify the provisions of 
the CCPA,144 reflecting a usual notice-and-comment administrative 
procedure. And, due to the passage of Proposition 24, California will 
have a new state agency called the California Privacy Protection 
Agency involved in this process. For the most part, the California 
Privacy Protection Agency holds the power to assess violations and 
issue fines.145 Individuals do, however, hold a more limited power to 
135 Id. § 1798.105(d)(1)–(9).  
136 Id. § 1798.120(a).  
137 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 21.  
138 CIV. § 1798.120(a).  
139 Id. § 1798.135(a)(1).  
140 Id. § 1798.135(a)(2)(A).  
141 See id. § 1798.120. This differs from the GDPR, which allows data processors and 
controllers to override data subjects’ objections with compelling, legitimate reasons for 
keeping data. GDPR, supra note 83, art. 21.  
142 CIV. § 1798.140(t)(1).  
143 See id. §§ 1798.155, 1798.185. 
144 Id. § 1798.185. 
145 California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 24, § 17 
(West) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155). 
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bring civil actions on their own behalf when their “nonencrypted and 
nonredacted personal information” has been subject to “unauthorized 
access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure” due to a business’s failure 
to appropriately secure the information.146 In other words, the agency 
may pursue claims for all CCPA violations, and individuals may pursue 
claims only for data breaches. This means individuals would not be 
able to pursue their own claims for a business’s failure to provide the 
ability to opt-out of data sales, for example. 
Businesses that violate the CCPA may face fines issued by the 
California Privacy Protection Agency. Fines are limited to $2,500 for 
each unintentional violation and $7,500 for each intentional 
violation,147 although there is no limit on the total fine that may be 
issued if several violations are found.148 The proceeds acquired from 
these fines then get deposited into the Consumer Privacy Fund,149 
a state fund created by the CCPA to offset the state courts’ costs of 
adjudicating data privacy actions and the costs of the Attorney 
General’s administrative duties.150 
An individual pursuing a civil action for data breaches must provide 
a thirty-day window for businesses to cure alleged violations.151 If the 
alleged violations are not cured within thirty days, the individual can 
then bring the action into court and seek damages—either damages 
within the range of $100 to $750 per violation, or actual damages, 
whichever is higher.152 Consumers also have the ability to pursue class 
actions with the same process and damages available.153 To determine 
the appropriate amount of damages to award, courts will apply any one 
or more of the factors listed in the CCPA.154 Additionally, courts may 
award injunctive or declaratory relief to individuals or classes.155 
Although this system is still fairly limited due to the low damage caps 
146 CIV. § 1798.150(a)(1). 
147 Id. § 1798.155(b).  
148 See id. 
149 Id. § 1798.155(c). 
150 Id. § 1798.160.  
151 Id. § 1798.150(b).  
152 Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).  
153 Id. § 1798.150(b).  
154 Id. § 1798.150(a)(2). The non-exhaustive list of factors for determining appropriate 
damages is as follows: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; the number of 
violations; the persistence of the misconduct; the time period over which misconduct 
occurred; the willfulness of the misconduct; and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net 
worth. Id.  
155 Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(B). 
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and restrictions on the types of actions that can be brought, the 
opportunity to seek compensation for data privacy violations is novel 
for the United States and presents a practical remedy when viewed in 
tandem with the administrative enforcement.156 
III 
THE LGBTQ EXPERIENCE ONLINE 
Because the current state of United States data privacy leaves 
particular communities vulnerable to information leaks, one might 
suggest that the most vulnerable communities should exercise greater 
caution online or reduce their internet presence. To be clear, this 
Comment rejects this suggestion as a solution. The breadth of 
information available online and the opportunities to communicate 
with like-minded individuals make the internet an extremely significant 
part of life for the LGBTQ community. Although it is true that certain 
incidents have illuminated the risks of LGBTQ participation in online 
communities, the solution should not be to abandon the significant 
opportunities that are available. Rather, those opportunities should be 
made safer through greater data privacy protections.  
The growth and development of the digital environment has created 
a hub for LGBTQ youth.157 The broad scope of information available 
online provides LGBTQ youth a place to explore the spectrum of 
sexual orientation and gender identity, develop a better sense of 
personal identity, and interact with like-minded people.158 Having 
space to learn and engage in discussions about the LGBTQ experience 
is crucial for LGBTQ people to understand their own identities.159 
Lingering social norms and stigmatization surrounding LGBTQ 
people, however, still affect the way community members approach 
their identity exploration.160 For many, this exploration needs to 
happen in secret, whether for fear of being disowned, outcasted, or 
156 Recall that the GDPR sets much higher damage caps and allows individuals to bring 
actions for any violation of the GDPR, not just data breaches. See discussion supra Section 
II.A.2.
157 See Jesse Fox & Rachel Ralston, Queer Identity Online: Informal Learning and
Teaching Experiences of LGBTQ Individuals on Social Media, 65 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 
635, 636 (2016). 
158 Id.  
159 See id. at 640–41. 
160 See Shelley L. Craig & Lauren McInroy, You Can Form a Part of Yourself Online: 
The Influence of New Media on Identity Development and Coming Out for LGBTQ Youth, 
18 J. GAY & LESBIAN MENTAL HEALTH 95, 98 (2014). 
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physically hurt.161 Consequently, there are two competing interests for 
the LGBTQ community online: the interest in exploring identity and 
the interest in remaining private. 
Over the years, LGBTQ youth have figured out a few ways to 
balance these competing interests. Tumblr, for example, became a 
popular site for LGBTQ youth to post and view content in the 2010 
decade.162 Tumblr introduced a platform where users could create 
their own “blogs” and follow other blogs with content matching their 
interests.163 The nature of this platform led most users to operate blogs 
separate from their usual social circles at school or within their local 
community (unlike sites like Facebook).164 As a result, Tumblr users 
enjoyed a certain level of anonymity if they chose not to disclose their 
names or faces. This anonymity thus allowed LGBTQ youth to find and 
share content to develop an understanding of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity without compromising their interest in keeping their 
intimate details secret from the people in their daily lives.165  
YouTube also arose as a popular platform for LGBTQ identity 
exploration.166 As some YouTube users became comfortable with 
sharing their coming out stories on the video streaming site, large 
audiences of LGBTQ youth could consume these stories.167 Having 
such content easily accessible allowed many LGBTQ youth to see how 
similar individuals overcame challenges and became happier with 
their identities.168 All the while, the youth consuming these videos did 
not have to reveal their own identities, either offline or online.169 
Consequently, YouTube provided space for youth to explore their own 
identities and enjoy commonalities with other LGBTQ individuals 
while maintaining anonymity.170 
Because the internet is such a significant space for members of the 
LGBTQ community, it is imperative that LGBTQ internet users are 
161 See id. at 104 (noting that anonymity allows for safer identity exploration in the face 
of homophobia and transphobia offline). 
162 See Fox & Ralston, supra note 157, at 639. 
163 About Page, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/about [https://perma.cc/PWV9 
-NS9Z].
164 Fox & Ralston, supra note 157, at 639.
165 See id. 
166 Craig & McInroy, supra note 160, at 102–03. 
167 Id. at 102.  
168 Id. at 103.  
169 Id. at 102–03. 
170 Id.  
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protected. Historically, however, the community has been vulnerable 
to data leaks and inappropriate use of information. For example, 
Grindr, a popular LGBTQ dating app, has a concerning history with the 
way it manages its users’ data.171 In 2018, Grindr faced backlash after 
a report revealed that the app had been sharing personal data with 
outside vendors.172 The data being shared included users’ HIV statuses, 
which represented a particularly egregious invasion of privacy for 
Grindr users who were HIV-positive.173 Because HIV status was—and 
still is—highly stigmatized in the United States, this disclosure of 
positive statuses posed serious discrimination concerns for Grindr 
users.174 Grindr contended that it always transmitted users’ data with 
encryption and made efforts to limit sharing information, but the app 
ultimately changed its policy altogether and stopped sharing HIV 
status.175 Unfortunately, however, this was only one incident out of 
multiple.  
Within the same year, Grindr also faced criticism for a flaw in its 
data security system that had the potential to leak millions of users’ 
personal information.176 The flaw was exposed when a third party 
created a website where Grindr users could link their accounts and 
pinpoint which users had blocked them on the dating app.177 When 
Grindr users began linking their accounts to this website, the site 
creator discovered he had access to users’ deleted photos, unread 
messages, email addresses, and GPS locations—even for users who had 
opted not to share their location data publicly on the Grindr app.178 In 
response, Grindr warned its users to not share their account information 
171 See David Pierson, Gay Dating App Grindr Changes Its Policy of Sharing Users’ 
HIV Status with Outside Vendors, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018, 5:41 PM), https://www.latimes 
.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-grindr-hiv-data-20180402-story.html; Brian Latimer, 
Grindr Security Flaw Exposes Users’ Location Data, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews 
.com/feature/nbc-out/security-flaws-gay-dating-app-grindr-expose-users-location-data 
-n858446 [https://perma.cc/USV2-M3R4] (Mar. 30, 2018, 9:34 AM); Janet Burns, Report
Says Grindr Exposed Millions of Users’ Private Data, Messages, Locations, FORBES
(Mar. 29, 2018, 1:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2018/03/29/report
-says-grindr-exposed-millions-of-users-private-data-messages-locations/#33d1e1ba5c4c
[https://perma.cc/4HA7-HSKK].




176 Burns, supra note 171. 
177 Id. 
178 Id.  
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with third parties.179 The app also updated its data security system to 
disallow access to the blocked account data in order to discourage the 
third party from continuing to operate his website.180 Notably, 
however, Grindr did not make any changes to disallow access to the 
other data.181  
Grindr once again came under fire at the start of 2020 for sharing 
personal information such as age, gender, and sexual orientation with 
thousands of online advertisers.182 Effectively, every time Grindr users 
opened the app, Grindr permitted advertising networks to gain private 
information about the users’ internet behaviors and demographics to 
profile them for targeted advertisements.183 This news became public 
following a Norwegian Consumer Council (NCC) report,184 which 
analyzed the app’s privacy policy.185  
Specifically, the NCC noted that Grindr’s privacy policy may have 
violated the European Union’s GDPR due to accountability shifting 
and vagueness.186 The NCC pointed to the fact that the Grindr privacy 
policy had to be accepted in its entirety upon downloading the app and 
that the app itself provided no additional information regarding the use 
of personal data.187 By accepting this privacy policy at the outset, 
Grindr users consented to sharing information about their location, 
their profile, and some of their demographics with advertisers.188  
But this term of the privacy policy also states that all the advertising 
partners’ privacy policies apply to personal data obtained by Grindr, 
179 Latimer, supra note 171.  
180 Id.  
181 Id. (“Two years after the location data was first revealed and addressed by Grindr, 
security researchers found they were still able to figure out users’ locations.”). 
182 Suhauna Hussain et al., Grindr, Tinder and OkCupid Apps Share Personal Data, 





185 NORWEGIAN CONSUMER COUNCIL, OUT OF CONTROL: HOW CONSUMERS  
ARE EXPLOITED BY THE ONLINE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 72–74 (2020), https://fil 
.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2020-01-14-out-of-control-final-version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ZYK-P7CN].  
186 Id. at 74.  
187 Id. at 72.  
188 How We May Share Data, GRINDR, https://www.grindr.com/privacy-policy/how-we 
-may-share/?lang=en-US [https://perma.cc/EXK9-AN72] (Dec. 8, 2020).
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while identifying only one of those advertising partners.189 
Consequently, Grindr users may be subject to the policies of numerous 
third-party advertising companies that the users have no way of 
finding.190 The NCC report argued that this term violates the GDPR 
because it attempts to shift the control over personal data away from 
Grindr itself.191 Additionally, NCC argued that this policy is overly 
vague and forces Grindr users to consent to a data collection system 
they can never fully understand.192 
Although this NCC report pointed to potential violations under the 
European Union’s privacy scheme, the report nonetheless sparked 
interest in the United States.193 In particular, the report raised questions 
about whether Grindr’s updated privacy policy failed to comply with 
California’s newly enacted CCPA.194 At the time of NCC’s report, the 
CCPA required companies to provide an opportunity to opt out of the 
practice of selling personal data, but Grindr arguably does not do 
this.195 Grindr does not offer specific opt-out opportunities; rather, 
Grindr asks users to consent to its entire privacy policy, which states 
that the app can “collect, use, share, and retain” but does not sell 
its users’ personal data.196 Furthermore, consent from users allows 
Grindr to disclose particular categories of information to third-party 
advertisers.197 Thus, Grindr’s attempts at writing around the opt-out 
requirement may violate California residents’ newly bestowed privacy 
rights. Without these privacy rights, Grindr’s policy would proceed 
unchecked, leaving its LGBTQ users vulnerable and without recourse. 
189 Id. (“The privacy policies of the third-party companies apply to their collection, use 
and disclosure of your Personal Data. One of our main advertising partners is MoPub that 
helps Grindr deliver personalized advertising.”). 
190 NORWEGIAN CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 185, at 74. 
191 Id. 
192 Id.  
193 Hussain et al., supra note 182. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. With the passing of Proposition 24 in California, the CCPA will also require that 
companies provide an opportunity to opt out of “sharing” personal data. California Privacy 
Rights Act of 2020, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 24, § 9 (West) (to be codified at CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1798.120).
196 Grindr Privacy and Cookie Policy, GRINDR, https://www.grindr.com/privacy-policy
/?lang=en-US [https://perma.cc/SLA3-F2ZM] (Dec. 8, 2020). 
197 How We May Share Data, supra note 188. 
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IV 
PROPOSING A SOLUTION 
As this Comment has demonstrated, the United States lacks a 
uniform method of protecting data privacy; instead, the United States 
has a patchwork system of protections, full of gaps that leave 
communities like the LGBTQ population vulnerable to data leaks 
and inappropriate data uses.198 Because this gap-filled effort at 
protecting data privacy is insufficient, it is time for the United States to 
move forward the way the European Union and California have. Thus, 
this Part calls for data privacy legislation at the federal level and 
proposes a framework for such legislation to follow. The proposed 
framework takes inspiration from the GDPR and CCPA and tailors 
their provisions to develop the appropriate scope, responsibilities, 
rights, and enforcement strategies for the United States. This Part also 
addresses concerns regarding the potential for intellectual property 
infringement and the feasibility of implementing a new system. 
A. The United States Framework
To create a uniform system that subsequently protects vulnerable 
communities, a United States data privacy scheme would need to be 
broadly applicable. Therefore, the scope of potential federal data 
privacy legislation should be analogous to that of the GDPR: the 
responsibility to comply should fall on all data controllers and 
processors who handle the data of United States residents.199 
California’s model that imposes CCPA responsibilities only on large 
businesses that meet threshold profit and data transaction 
requirements200 would not sufficiently further the goal of uniformity. 
The California model may protect its residents from large technology 
companies infringing on their privacy, but it inherently leaves gaps in 
the protection by imposing different standards on different entities. The 
California model also leaves the door open for companies to design 
their business models around the threshold requirements and thus avoid 
strict responsibilities. Consequently, for the sake of uniformity and 
effective protection, the United States is better off creating a system 
that applies to all collection, storage, and use of United States residents’ 
data.  
198 See discussion supra Sections I.B.–C. 
199 See supra Section II.A. 
200 See supra Section II.B. 
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The United States should also follow the European Union’s example 
regarding what responsibilities to impose on data controllers and 
processors. Just as the GDPR requires, a United States data privacy 
scheme should limit data collection to specific, legitimate purposes and 
limit data storage to the amount of time necessary to fulfill such 
purposes. Frontloading responsibilities on data controllers and 
processors in this way makes the goals of data privacy legislation clear 
and mitigates the potential for harm before harm ever occurs. 
Additionally, the United States should hold data controllers and 
processors accountable in the same manner as the European Union and 
require such entities to demonstrate their compliance. Not only would 
this accountability system be an effective check on data controllers and 
processors but it would also reveal areas in which data privacy 
protections were still lacking. As a result, a system that holds data 
controllers and processors responsible for limiting their practices and 
evaluating their own compliance would be the most effective model for 
the United States.  
The United States should also take inspiration from both the GDPR 
and CCPA regarding residents’ rights. More specifically, the United 
States should grant its residents the following: the right to access 
reports of how data is being collected, stored, and used; the right to 
correct errors in data; the right to object to data uses outside the data 
subject’s interests; the right to erase data under particular 
circumstances; and the right to opt out of data sales. This set of rights 
should not perfectly mirror either the GDPR or CCPA; rather, it should 
incorporate the pieces of each that are most appropriate for a federal 
data privacy scheme, balancing data controllers’ practicality concerns 
and data subjects’ autonomy concerns. 
For example, the rights to object to certain data uses and erase data 
under particular circumstances should more closely resemble the 
GDPR’s model. The CCPA does not provide an ongoing right to 
object.201 This right is important to include in a federal system, 
however, because it gives residents greater control over the accuracy 
of their data and a more active role in how their data is being used. 
Without the ongoing right to object, residents would lack a continuing 
line of communication with data controllers and would have only 
administrative and judicial forums for their complaints.  
The right to erase data should also resemble the right as enumerated 
in the GDPR, which provides specific situations where erasing data is 
201 See discussion supra Section II.B.1. 
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necessary.202 The CCPA does not require particular circumstances for 
California’s residents to exercise the right to erase their data; rather, the 
CCPA provides a long list of exceptions that businesses can invoke to 
avoid requests to erase data.203 This ability to freely erase data unless 
a business can find an exception may be counterproductive, and it 
implicates issues with hackers and intellectual property infringers 
discussed later in Section IV.B. Thus, a United States federal data 
privacy scheme should enumerate specific circumstances for data 
erasure, similar to the GDPR.  
Regarding the right of access and the right to opt out of data sales, 
however, the CCPA serves as a more appropriate example. The CCPA 
explicitly outlines a protocol for requesting data reports: businesses 
must have free-of-charge methods for requesting data, via phone, 
email, or website interface.204 Explicitly requiring such a protocol 
makes the process of requesting data more accessible and user-friendly 
for residents who may be confused by the technical nature of data 
processing or unaware of their right to make requests. Accordingly, the 
United States should follow California’s lead with respect to the right 
of access and require clear procedures for making data requests. 
Additionally, the United States should maintain the CCPA’s right to 
opt out of data being sold,205 which is not available under the GDPR. 
This right is significant, as a common concern with data privacy is that 
the data provided to one entity gets transacted out into the ether.206 
Maintaining a right to opt out enables residents to know exactly who 
has their data and prevent it from ending up in someone else’s hands.  
A federal data privacy scheme should also separately categorize 
sensitive data and require heightened levels of consent for processing 
this kind of data. Separately categorizing sensitive data in this way 
would be the most direct method of preventing the potential 
discrimination that this Comment has grounded itself in. Explicitly 
202 As previously mentioned, the specific situations in which a data subject may request 
data erasure include when data has been processed unlawfully, data is no longer necessary 
for fulfilling relevant purposes, or the requisite consent has been withdrawn. GDPR, supra 
note 83, art. 7.  
203 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(1)–(9) (West 2020). 
204 Id. § 1798.130(a)(1).  
205 Id. § 1798.120. 
206 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, 
and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/9P4B 
-GKYC].
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requiring clear, affirmative consent to use sensitive information, like 
LGBTQ status, would allow LGBTQ individuals to pursue their 
interests in identity exploration, knowing that a system is in place to 
protect the precise information they wish to keep private. Accordingly, 
heightened consent for sensitive data does the heavy lifting to 
balance the LGBTQ community’s competing interests in uninhibited 
exploration and privacy.  
In order to enforce the proposed framework, the United States 
should also follow California’s example by designating supervisory 
authority to an administrative agency. While CCPA violations are 
assessed and pursued in court by the California Attorney General and 
the California Privacy Protection Agency, the United States could 
delegate authority to the FTC. The FTC already pursues data privacy 
actions under its current statutory mandate,207 and the agency 
has expressed significant interest in taking on a larger role.208 
Consequently, the FTC is likely equipped to take on the role of 
overseeing data privacy under a more robust statutory scheme, 
especially considering how much clearer the FTC’s role would be when 
given more specific procedures.  
The United States should also follow the CCPA’s model regarding 
individuals’ ability to file actions in court.209 For example, requiring a 
thirty-day window of notice to allow data controllers to correct 
mistakes would be an efficient and practical way for the United 
States to handle violations. Such a model, again, reinforces the 
communication between data subjects and data controllers while 
preventing data subjects from clogging courts with privacy actions. 
This model would also lead to much faster corrections than if courts 
adjudicated every potential claim. Because the harm and collateral 
effects of improperly used data are more significant than the monetary 
value that could be assigned, a system in which data subjects and data 
controllers quickly work together to cure the improper use furthers the 
purposes of data privacy protections better than abundant opportunities 
for monetary damages would.  
B. Lingering Concerns
Some may argue that the United States should not create its own 
federal data privacy scheme because it may strain the enforcement of 
207 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.  
208 See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 39, at i–iv. 
209 See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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intellectual property rights.210 More specifically, assigning more 
expansive rights to internet users—such as the rights to erase data and 
object to disclosures—may make it more difficult for owners of 
exclusive intellectual property rights to identify infringers online.211 
For example, if a writer authored and shared an article on a personal 
blog and later found that another writer had appropriated a large portion 
of the article—infringing the original writer’s copyright—the original 
writer would likely want to pursue the infringer.  
Traditionally, the original writer would be able to do this by 
searching a directory of domain name registrants maintained by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.212 Through 
this directory, the original writer would be able to identify the infringer 
based on the domain name with which the infringer was associated, 
thus enabling the writer to pursue enforcement of their exclusive rights. 
If the infringer’s rights in this scenario restricted the extent to which 
the controller of the directory data could disclose the infringer’s 
identity, the original writer may run into a significant roadblock.  
Fortunately for the writer in this scenario, however, the framework 
this Comment has proposed for a United States data privacy scheme 
leaves room to acquire the necessary identification information.213 
Under the proposed framework, data controllers and processors would 
be responsible for limiting their data practices to legitimate purposes; 
pursuing infringers of intellectual property should be considered a 
legitimate purpose. Therefore, data controllers and processors would 
have an avenue to justify disclosing the identities of infringers to 
owners of exclusive intellectual property rights without fear of 
violating the infringers’ privacy rights.  
Furthermore, a more uniform system of data privacy protection 
does not conflict with the United States intellectual property regime as 
much as this hypothetical scenario may suggest. In fact, a uniform data 
privacy system dovetails nicely with the purposes of copyright and 
210 See generally Tara M. Aaron, Availability of WHOIS Information After the GDPR—
Is It Time to Panic?, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 1129 (2018) (arguing that the GDPR makes 
it more difficult for brand owners to find the identities of trademark infringers); Patrick 
Wheeler & Mette Marie Kennedy, Practical Tips on GDPR for Intellectual Property 
Attorneys, A.B.A. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property 
_law/publications/landslide/2018-19/january-february/practical-tips-gdpr-intellectual 
-property-attorneys/ [https://perma.cc/ATX9-E2FV].
211 See Wheeler & Kennedy, supra note 210.
212 See Aaron, supra note 210, at 1132. 
213 See supra Section IV.A.  
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patent protections. The Intellectual Property Clause of the United 
States Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate the 
copyright and patent systems for the sake of “promot[ing] the 
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”214 The underlying purpose of
having copyrights and patents is thus to encourage inventors, authors,
and creators to give society new, innovative works; protecting data
privacy helps further this purpose. With greater data protections, the
internet would be a safer forum for all internet users, which would
encourage a greater number of content creators to contribute to the
progress the Constitution aims to promote.
One might also argue that the United States is simply not prepared 
to upend its current data practices and that enacting data privacy 
legislation would be burdensome for companies handling large 
amounts of consumer data. This argument fails, however, when 
considering the timeline of global data privacy progress. The United 
States would not be starting from scratch. The European Union’s 
system, due to its broad scope, has already sparked large international 
companies to change their practices and come into compliance with a 
more stringent scheme.215 Additionally, California’s efforts have 
added another layer of compliance for companies maintaining data, and 
other states have also made strides toward protecting their residents’ 
privacy online.216  
With this information in mind, the question should not be whether 
companies are equipped to adjust to new privacy protections—
companies have already had to adjust. Rather, the question should be 
whether companies are better equipped to tailor their practices to 
numerous privacy schemes or just one uniform scheme. If the concern 
is the burden of compliance, it logically follows that a singular scheme 
lessens the burden. Of course, a federal data privacy scheme would 
inevitably remain separate from something like the GDPR, so global 
companies would not be able to escape considering more than one set 
of responsibilities. But within the United States, Congress has the 
power to centralize the way data privacy is handled and move the 
214 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
215 See Rob Sobers, The Average Reading Level of a Privacy Policy, VARONIS, https: 
//www.varonis.com/blog/gdpr-privacy-policy/ [https://perma.cc/V26Q-4NYT] (Mar. 29, 
2020). 
216 Carsten Rhod Gregersen, The US Is Leaving Data Privacy to the States—and That’s 
a Problem, BRINK (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.brinknews.com/the-us-is-leaving-data 
-privacy-to-the-states-and-thats-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/WCU3-J94U] (noting that
New York, Maine, Nevada, Maryland, Texas, and North Dakota have all taken steps to
protect data privacy to varying extents).
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country away from multiple state systems that impose different 
standards. Congress has the opportunity to ease the burden on 
companies holding large amounts of data while providing United States 
residents with crucial protections.  
CONCLUSION 
The rapid development of technology has created a world in which 
our personal data is ubiquitous. People around the globe carry cell 
phones, laptops, smart watches, and a number of other devices with 
them everywhere they go—and those devices have the power to string 
together each person’s precise story using the abundance of 
information they hold. For some communities, the risk of this 
information being abused or leaked poses significant consequences. As 
this Comment has shown, the LGBTQ community in particular faces 
risks from the phenomenon of “outing” and potential discrimination at 
the hands of unprotected data. Thus, from the student who is afraid of 
being outed by advertisements on a public bus to the thousands of 
LGBTQ citizens who have had their HIV status leaked, the LGBTQ 
community presents a strong case for increased data privacy 
protections. While steps have been taken to afford greater protections 
in the European Union and California, the United States has yet to take 
steps at the federal level. This Comment, through the lens of the 
LGBTQ experience online, demonstrates why it is time for the United 
States to take those steps. To catch up with the global developments in 
data and to protect United States residents from harm, Congress must 
standardize this country’s data privacy regime. 
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